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Kallergi Olga

EXPORTING U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND POLICIES
TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ARENA. A COMPARATIVE STUDY:
THE EFFECT ON OTHER COUNTRIES’ LEGAL SYSTEMS

I. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 9/11 set in motion a new era
all over the world: an era of a world uniting against a common enemy, but also an era of
insecurity and fear. Laws have been changed worldwide, nations have united against a common
threat, legal theories and beliefs of centuries have been questioned, and civil liberties have been
replaced by a need for national safety. Has this worldwide effort worked? Is our world a better
place now that we are all fighting the same enemy? Did we learn from our past mistakes? And if
yes, did we learn the right lessons?
There is no doubt that we are all more united than ever in our effort to fight this universal war
against terrorism. We all agree the terrorists need to be hunted down and brought to justice
wherever they are. Do we agree on who they are though? Do we agree on what methods to use in
this fight? Do we agree on how much we are willing to sacrifice in our effort to make our world a
safer place? Are we all ready to accept that the end justifies the means? And is it realistic to talk
about an international consensus in what this war is all about and how to win it? History shows
that, despite the common efforts that have been made internationally, we are still a long way from
implementing an international anti-terrorism legislation based on a consensus of all countries.
The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples of the difficulties the international
1

community is having in agreeing upon what needs to be done and how. Both of these wars were
carried out in the name of world safety and peace. The goal was to find the terrorists and bring
them to justice. One would think that such a noble cause would be pursued by the majority of
countries. Reality, however, is different. The war in Iraq, for instance, has been highly criticized
by many countries, including most of the European Union members, and was opposed to, even by
traditional allies of the nations that executed this operation.
Moreover, the outcome of these efforts is doubtful. With both wars officially over, our world
somehow does not feel safer; at least not to the extent we were hoping it would. The relations
between the Eastern and the Western world are now tenser than ever, the Middle East seems
dangerously unstable and peace and democracy have not yet been efficiently established. Some
people talked about a war against Islam, trying to create the impression that there is a religious
conflict that has been instigated by the West; whatever the arguments behind such an accusation,
it is nonetheless a dangerous argument which in some, though isolated, incidents, has been
supported by facts. Many Muslims found themselves in a very uncomfortable situation, in their
everyday lives, after 9/11, having to convince their neighbors that they are not terrorists. In the
United States alone, the number of people arrested after 9/11 has been extremely high; on
December 2002, in Southern California only, more than a thousand males over 16 years of age
from various Islamic countries were detained without warning, after having been asked to report
to the immigration authorities.
It was incidents such as this that threatened to deprive the world’s efforts from their true
meaning and value and transform them to religious hatred. Despite the attempts that have been
made internationally, to agree upon certain terms and plan a common strategy in the war against
terrorism, the results are rather discouraging. Although we all agree on the necessity of an
internationally accepted definition of terrorism, we seem unable to succeed. One man’s terrorist
is another man’s hero and one country’s threat seems to be another country’s salvation. A vivid
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example of this has been Russia and its conflict with the Chechen separatists; the Russian
leadership has been trying to convince the international community that the acts of the Chechens
are an international terrorism problem and that Russia needs the help and support of Europe and
its allies. Other countries, however, seem reluctant to interfere, considering this an internal
conflict that does not amount to an international threat and for which Russia’s tactics and politics
are responsible1. The cultural and religious differences, as well as political aspects, create a
substantial hardship for many countries to reach an agreement on who the enemy is and what
measures are needed, in order for that enemy to be defeated.
In this comparative study we willfocus on the effect that recent counter -terrorism efforts have
had on different legal systems. There are many obstacles that need to be overcome, and in this
effort it is important to realize that we need to respect the unique characteristics of each country’s
legal tradition as well as its culture and beliefs. We will start by examining the conditions in a
number of different countries as well as the steps these countries took to fight terrorism through
legislative amendments and procedures and through significant trials and their outcome. Through
these examples, we will show that different legal approaches, such as the United States and
British counter-terrorism policies, have not been as successful as it was hoped, and have created
controversies and obstacles that seem more harmful than helpful. In light of this conclusion, we
will second-guess the efficiency of the so far implemented anti-terrorism strategy and propose a
different approach, which could solve some of the problems, and lead to a more efficient, but also
less controversial, method of making our world a safer place for everyone. International
cooperation and mutually agreed procedures should be part of this different approach.

1

Jim Heintz, “Russia Criticizes West over Chechen Asylum”, Thursday September 9th, 2004, available at:
http://news.findlaw.com/ap_stories.
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND THE
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

In light of recent terrorism strikes all over the world, it seems worthwhile to consider the
difficulties inherent in adapting and implementing a common international anti-terrorism strategy
into various countries’ legal systems throughout the world. We will start by examining the
situation in Greece, where recent developments in legislation as well as the neutralization of one
of the most active terrorist organizations raised a number of issues, both legal and practical about
the effectiveness of the contemporary methods used in counter-terrorism efforts.
A. THE GREEK PRECEDENT.
One of the most active terrorist groups in Western Europe in the 1980’s was the
Revolutionary Organization “17 November”, based in Greece. With a presence of almost three
decades, it has also been characterized as Europe’s most elusive terrorist group2. It was named
after the student uprising in Athens on the 17th of November 1973, against the dictatorship that
was imposed on the country, an uprising that ended violently causing the deaths of students after
the military tanks broke down the gates of the University to force the students out and end the
protests3. “17 November” identified itself politically as an extreme-left group, with ideologies
that were closer related to Marx-Lenin beliefs and an anti-imperialistic, anti-capitalist and antiUnited States and NATO strategy. The organization’s first operation was the assassination of
Richard Welsh, the CIA’s station chief in Athens in 1975 and its last victim was British defense
attaché Stephen Saunders, who was shot dead while driving to work on June 20004.

2

International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
3
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
4
BBC News: British Diplomat shot dead in Athens, Thursday, June 8th, 2000. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/782245.stm (last visited 11/29/2004)
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During these three decades, “17 November” has claimed responsibility for 22 killings and a
number of bomb and rocket attacks. Their targets were primarily American officials or US
interest corporations (such as banks or companies), but also two Turkish diplomats and a
number of Greek businessmen, politicians and policemen. The reason why this organization has
attracted the attention and concerns of many countries, such as the U.S., Britain, and others is
the fact that until June 2003 no members of the organization had been arrested and despite the
fact that in a number of incidents the Greek authorities came literally face to face with the
terrorists, no significant progress had been made to put an end to the group’s lethal action. The
Greek authorities’ inefficiency in arresting members of the group and solving the “mystery” of
the “17 November” was the target of intense criticism from countries that have been traditional
allies of Greece but also from the Greek people themselves, a majority of whom for many years
believed the terrorist group had affiliations with members of the government and politicians in
general5. The impact of this criticism in the Greek economy was severe, especially in the mid80s’. In 1985, under the Reagan Presidency, a travel advisory direction was issued from the U.S.
government, warning Americans not to visit Greece for safety reasons. A number of such
directions followed through the years6. In addition to that, negative comments about Greece’s
counter-terrorism efforts were published in the U.S. Press7.
In fear of isolation and due to the economic pressures by the international community, the
Greek authorities tried to show good faith by taking certain steps towards a more effective
legislation. The outcome of the above mentioned pressure were the first two anti-terrorism laws
that were voted on by the Greek parliament in 1990, the 774/78 Law (that was originally passed
5

International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism; Tally Kritzman, “Greek Counter-Terrorism”, August 8, 2000.
Available at: http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
6
M. Bossis: Greece and Terrorism-National and International Dimensions, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens,
1996, p. 35.
7
“Not surprisingly, world politics also works to the terrorist’s advantage. In the spring of 1984, the Greek
government of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou provided a grotesque and unforgivable example of that. In
response to stiff protests, the Greeks at one point last summer accused the C.I.A. of conducting unilateral operations
in their territory. The State Department regards the Greek performance as directly traceable to Papandreou’s harshly
anti-American political style.” John Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round, a Freemasonry of Terrorism, The New
Yorker, July 8, 1985.
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in 1978, revoked in 1983 and re-voted in 1990) and the 1916/90 Law8. Despite these efforts, no
significant progress was made, and the terrorists continued their action. The assassination of the
British official Stephen Saunders, however, in June 2000 appears to be a turning point in the
way the Greek government had been handling terrorism. Only a few years before the Olympic
Games in Athens (an event of significant financial as well as moral value for the Greek people)
and under the international outcry, the Greek authorities realized that there was too much at
stake for the country and that an immediate and determined reaction was needed. Just days
before the assassination of Stephen Saunders, the National Commission on Terrorism, appointed
by the U.S. Congress, recommended designating Greece as a state “not cooperating fully” with
U.S. counterterrorism efforts9. The National Commission’s recommendations referred to the
Annual Report of the U.S. State Department in 1999, which mentioned Greece as “remaining
one of the weakest links in Europe’s efforts against terrorism”10.
Due to nationwide discontent and a feeling of insecurity among the Greek people, the
government started a huge publicity campaign; the majority of the media broadcasted Antiterrorism messages, stressing the threat posed by terrorism to human life, social and political
order and democratic values11. This extensive use of the media aimed to achieve several goals,
such as uniting public opinion against a common enemy, putting pressure on the public to reveal
any relevant information on terrorists and sending a clear message to the international
community that Greece is committed to fighting terrorism. Greece sought the help of allies with
great experience in counter-terrorism efforts; it established an intense cooperation with the
United Kingdom. As a result, a counter-terrorism seminar was held on July 11th and 12th of year
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M. Bossis, Antiterrorism Legislation: Greece and International Environment, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens,
2004, pp. 19-25.
9
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: U.S.-Greek counter-terrorism, August 8, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004).
10
U.S. Department of State: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html (last visited 11/29/2004).
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International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
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2000, with the participation of high-level British security personnel, as well as several members
of the Greek government and the British ambassador12. The British expertise offered valuable
assistance in reorganizing the Greek security forces and constructing a single anti-terrorism
body, similar to the British Counter Terrorism Police Department (CTPD); sophisticated
surveillance techniques were introduced for the first time to the Greek authorities and the two
countries agreed to hold joint anti-terrorist exercises and to exchange technological knowledge
in the field13. British officials recommended that Greece adopt a comprehensive Anti-Terrorism
Bill similar to the one legislated in Britain, without weakening the country’s commitment to
human rights14. Finally, several meetings between British and Greek officials took place and
collaboration started within the lower operational levels, including bilateral meetings of British
and Greek officers15. In addition, the British authorities noted the importance of legislative
changes in existing anti-terrorism laws, in order to gain the support of the public in volunteering
information to the police, increase punishments for terrorism and increase the authorities’
independence and level of expertise.
Furthermore, during a meeting of European Union Foreign Ministers in Luxemburg on June
13, 2000, Greece expressed its will to cooperate with other European Union States, in order to
fight terrorism more effectively, a statement that was warmly greeted by the British16. Two
months later that year, in September, a protocol of cooperation against terrorism was signed
with the United States17. The agreement, signed by both parties, prohibits the two states from
interfering in one another’s judicial systems (a provision desired by the Greek party, due to
12

International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
13
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
14
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; affirmative steps in counterterrorism, 2000. Available at: http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
15
BBC News: “British police join Greek murder probe”, Friday, June 9, 2000; “U.K. and Greece tackle terrorism”,
Thursday, July 13, 2000. Both articles available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe (last visited 11/29/2004)
16
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
17
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
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intense criticism from Greek public opinion that Washington was being given too much
involvement in internal Greek affairs). It involves, however, special legal procedures in order to
be passed into law. It allows the exchange of information between the two parties on crimes
ranging from money laundering to political assassination plots, and it provides for joint
investigation and mutual support for investigations for such crimes taking place on both U.S.
and Greek territory; prior to the agreement, a number of proposals had been made from the U.S.
authorities to Greece to change its legislation18. For the purposes of this research, it will be
helpful to briefly mention the most significant ones, which were the following:
•

Exoneration for members of terrorist groups who “repent” and agree to provide
information on fellow group members

•

Immunity from prosecution for anti-terrorist squad members who infiltrate terrorist
groups and take part in attacks as part of a plan to crack the group open from within

•

Creation of a “special” court, without a jury, to try terrorist cases. The magistrates
selected for this court would be exclusively engaged to preside over such cases

•

Rewards for witnesses who turn in terrorists

•

Creation of a witness protection program

•

Permission of foreign police and security agencies (such as the FBI) to operate in the
country independently of local authorities

•

An extension on the pre-trial custody period and on the time a suspect can be held for
questioning without charge (which at the time was 18 months)

•

The creation of a special team, which would include legal experts, to carry out the
questioning.19

18

International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
19
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; Washington proposes changes to
Greek terrorism laws, August 8, 2000. Available at: http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited
11/29/2004)
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The relevant agreements made with both the U.S. and the British government, led to close
cooperation of the three countries’ authorities. Technology was brought to Greece that was used
by the police for surveillance and the collection of information, and the tactics of investigation
changed20. As a result, on June 29, 2002, a so-called “serendipitous” incident caused a chain of
events that finally led to the neutralization of the terrorist organization “November 17”; although
the starting event was a lucky one, there is no doubt that the Greek police much more thoroughly
collected and evaluated data from the place of that incident, thanks to the more advanced
technological means at their disposal and the valuable guidance of U.S. and British expertise. The
incident was the premature explosion of a bomb on the hands of a terrorist at the port of Piraeus,
in Athens, that severely wounded him. Police was able to arrest him and gather valuable clues
found on the scene such as a number of keys, documents and fingerprints. One thing led to
another and within a few months all of the organization’s hideouts were discovered, and terrorists
were arrested and brought to justice21.
The legal framework, under which interrogations, arrests and indictments were made, was the
new terrorist law that the Greek parliament had passed in 2001. Law 2928/2001, or the “TerrorLaw”, as it is called colloquially, had adopted most of the proposals of the British and U.S.
authorities, to which we referred earlier22. Under this Law, all terrorism-related crimes would
now be tried by a “special court”, the Criminal Court of Appeals, excluding the jury from being
part of the trial procedure. DNA analysis was now allowed, under certain strict circumstances,
infiltration of the terrorist organization was legal, a witness protection program was founded, and
more severe punishments were established for terrorism related crimes23. These were the most

20

International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Greek Counter terrorism; symbolic steps, 2000. Available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
21
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism: Breakthrough in cracking 17 November Terror Group, July
18, 2002. Available at: http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm (last visited 11/29/2004)
22
Ioannis Manoledakis; “Safety and Freedom: Interpretation of Law 2928/2001 on organized crime”, Ant. N.
Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens, 2002. Also see: http://www.parliament.gr.
23
Ioannis Manoledakis; “Safety and Freedom: Interpretation of Law 2928/2001 on organized crime”, Ant. N.
Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens, 2002, pp. 34-35.
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important changes made to the Greek judicial system. The timing was at least “too perfect”, as it
seems this law was passed exactly to assist the authorities in what would soon follow.
The “trial of the century” (as it was characterized by the Greek media and public) started on
March 2003. In order to really understand why that name was given to it, we need only look at
the numbers that are quite impressive: 19 defendants, 23 murders, 184 attempts of murder,
dozens of armed robberies and explosions, 77 seriously injured victims, 273 prosecution
witnesses, 236 defense witnesses, 38 prosecution attorneys, 32 defense attorneys. The indictment
was 1412 pages long, and it was estimated that 47 hours would be needed simply to read it. The
punishments were equally impressive, at least for the Greek legal scene: 1. Dimitris Koufontinas
(who was considered the “right hand” of the leader of the organization) sentenced to 13 times life
imprisonment and 1965 years of imprisonment and a fine of 23.500 euros, 2. Alexandros
Giotopoulos (considered to be the leader of the organization) sentenced to 21 times life
imprisonment, 2109 years of imprisonment and a fine of 21.000 euros, 3. Savas Ksiros (the
terrorist that was injured in the explosion and was arrested first) sentenced to 6 times life
imprisonment, 1776 years of imprisonment and a fine of 23.500 euros, 4. Xristodoulos Ksiros
sentenced to 10 times life imprisonment, 1376 years of imprisonment and a fine of 5.000 euros,
5. Vasilis Tzortzatos sentenced to 4 times life imprisonment, 1249 years of imprisonment and a
fine of 6.500 euros, 6. P. Tselentis sentenced to 344 years of imprisonment, 7. Vasilis Ksiros
sentenced to 154 years of imprisonment and a fine of 7.500 euros, 8. Dimitris Georgiadis
sentenced to 9 years of imprisonment and a fine of 1.500 euros, 9. Kostas Karatsolis sentenced
to 45 years of imprisonment and a fine of 1.500 euros, 10. Ilias Kostaris sentenced to life
imprisonment, 54 years of imprisonment and a fine of 1.500 euros, 11. Th. Serifis sentenced to
17 years of imprisonment, 12. Kostas Telios sentenced to 120 years of imprisonment, 13. P.
Serifis sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment, 14. Nikos Papanastasiou sentenced to 8 years of
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imprisonment and 15. S. Kondylis sentenced to 51 years of imprisonment. The remaining four
defendants were acquitted, but the prosecutor appealed for two of them24.
As impressive as the sentences may seem, for the purposes of this research we need to focus
on the defendants’ arguments that raised a number of issues, which show how problematic the
enforcement of current anti-terrorism policies can be. We hereby refer to the opening statement
of one of the terrorists, addressing the court and summarizing all the defense arguments that were
brought into this trial: “I consider your Court without jurisdiction, prejudiced and thus unjust and
unlawful; without jurisdiction, because it is called to try political acts, which can only be tried by
the people and history. Prejudiced and unjust, because by trying to present political acts as
criminal ones, it deprives us of our opportunity to present the political and historic frames within
which those acts were decided and implemented, while at the same time it implies different
motives than the ones we had. Unlawful, because we are brought in front of it based on a law,
voted by 20 members of the parliament, requested by an “elite” placed above the nation, made
especially for us, after two unsuccessful attempts to impose similar laws, as well as based on
other special provisions that were legislated during the progress of our case… All these laws and
previsions are contrary even to our Constitution.. In addition you, as judges, are called to create
a legal precedent that will legalize the invasion and suspension of rights that have existed for
centuries, so that every court in the future will lawfully violate them according to political
interests… We will be tried by a special court, which will count on confessions only… As far as I
am concerned, my confessions were given under the following circumstances: I was held a
prisoner for 40 days, contrary to every law, in a hospital bed with my eyes shut, sleepless for 4
consecutive days and nights, tied up, with strong ropes especially the first 10 days, constantly
interrogated with no sense of time, under conditions of psychological violence, under threats of
being extradited as well as life threats, under an atmosphere of fear and the influence of

24

Michalis Dimitriou, “Juror at the Trial of 17 November”, Stafyllides Publishers, Athens, 2004, p. 597.
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psychotropic drugs that destroyed my personality by bringing me in a state of a child with no
will, creating illusions and inability to separate the imaginary from the real.”25.
These were basically the main objections and protests of the defense attorneys. The most
important one that concerned the court was the nature of the crimes committed; were they
political crimes or crimes of the common penal law? In order to better understand why so much
significance was given to the definition of the crimes committed, we need to possess a deep
knowledge of the Greek legal system. In many countries, as well as in Greece, the actor of a
common crime receives a harsher treatment and punishment than the actor of a political crime26.
According to the Greek constitution, amnesty can be given under certain circumstances for a
political crime, but never for a common criminal law crime (Article 47, Sections 3 and 4).
Furthermore, a political crime can only be tried by a mixed court (formed by regular judges and
jurors) (Article 97). Finally, if the actor is a foreign citizen who is fighting for a political change
in his country, to make it more liberal, extradition is not permitted under the Greek Constitution
(Article 5, Section 2). As we can understand, it was of major importance for the terrorists under
trial to be considered political actors, since then they would have the opportunity to be tried by
jurors and hope for lighter sentences (or possibly no sentences at all).
Closely related to the above mentioned argument, was the objection of the illegality of the
“special court” that was founded specifically to try the terrorists. Under the new anti-terrorism
law, every crime that every member of the terrorist organization commits, whether related or not
to the goals of the organization is placed under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court of Appeals
(Article 187, Section 1 of the Criminal Code, as it was amended by the new anti-terrorism law).
According to the Greek Constitution, however, and specifically Article 97, these types of crimes,
such as murders for instance, are under the jurisdiction of the mixed jury courts as a matter of law
and the criminal court of appeals only has exceptional jurisdiction in the specific situations
25

Mixalis Dimitriou, “Juror at the trial of 17 November”, Stafyllides Publishers, Athens, March 2004, pp. 31-32.
M. Bossis, “Antiterrorism Legislation: Greece and International Environment”, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers,
Athens, March 2004, p. 206.
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enumerated in the Constitution27. Taking into consideration all these factors, we can safely
assume that the “special court” objection was well-founded and rational, in accordance to the
Greek legal framework. The relevant provision of the new anti-terrorism law was the target of
intense criticism even in the early stages of discussion of the law in the parliament, but it will be
further examined later.
Finally, a number of objections were raised concerning the circumstances under which the
defendants were held under custody, the time-frames of their detention as well as the methods
used to obtain “confessions” and valuable information. At least in one incident, such objections
were supported by evidence of extreme psychological violence and threats of extradition to the
United States28. Having analyzed above the conditions prior to the enactment of the new law in
Greece (and especially the proposals made by the British and United States officials as to
legislative changes needed for a more efficient reaction of the Greek authorities to terrorism), we
highlight here the connection between the defense arguments and objections and the specific law
provisions that were attacked by them: the “special court” institution, that excluded jurors as well
as the prohibition of defining such crimes as political, were both the outcome of foreign
influences, unknown to the Greek legislation until now. More specifically, under the European
Counter-Terrorism Convention, which Greece ratified in 1988, all thereby defined as terrorist
crimes will not be considered political or crimes inspired by political motives29. As for the
“special

court” provision, it has already been stated above that it was a proposal of both the

British and the U.S. authorities. These “imported” policies seem to directly contradict a legal
tradition of decades in Greece as well as fundamental constitutional statutes.

27

Ioannis Manoledakis, “Safety and Freedom: Interpretation of Law 2928/2001 on organized crime”, Ant. N.
Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens, 2002, p. 205.
28
Michalis Dimitriou, “Juror at the trial of 17 November”, Stafyllides Publishers, Athens, March 2004, p. 240.
29
M. Bossis, “Antiterrorism Legislation: Greece and International Environment”, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers,
Athens, 2004, p. 49.
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In light of these observations, a further study of the international arena is required, in order to
examine whether this has been a local issue, of limited importance, or whether other countries as
well are facing similar difficulties in implementing an international policy on fighting terrorism.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT

1. Yemen.
In September 2004, another trial against terrorists ended in Yemen. The trial involved the deadly
attack against the American destroyer “Cole” that took place in 2000, in the southern Yemeni port
of Aden. While the destroyer was refueling, two men in a small boat laden with explosives
bashed into the side of it, causing an explosion that killed 17 United States sailors and opened a
gaping tear in the destroyer’s hull30. The judge sentenced two of the defendants, Abd al-Rahim
al-Nashiri and Jamal al-Badawi to death and four other defendants to prison terms of up to 10
years. Nashiri was tried in absentia, due to the fact that he had been arrested in the United Arab
Emirates and transferred into American hands in 2002 and is currently held in custody at an
undisclosed location outside the United States31. He is considered to be the mastermind behind
the Cole bombing and since he was arrested by the United States authorities, he has not been
granted access to lawyers or visits by human rights groups. It remains unclear whether the
American government is willing to transfer him to Yemen to face the death penalty or whether it
will resist such a request on legal grounds or because of his intelligence value. All of the
defendants were Al Qaeda members32.

30

The New York Times; Neil Macfarquhar and David Johnston, “Death Sentences in Attack on Cole”, September 30,
2004. Available at: www.nytimes.com (last visited 11/29/2004)
31
The New York Times; Neil Macfarquhar and David Johnston, “Death Sentences in Attack on Cole”, September
30, 2004. Available at: www.nytimes.com (last visited 11/29/2004)
32
The New York Times; Neil Macfarquhar and David Johnston, “Death Sentences in Attack on Cole”, September
30, 2004. Available at: www.nytimes.com (last visited 11/29/2004)
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It is important to examine the pre-trial conditions, in order to better understand the
significance of this trial as well as the issues that were raised. Prior to bringing the terrorists to
justice, a thorough but in some cases intense investigative effort had been made. There had been a
close cooperation of Yemeni and United States authorities that in some occasions jeopardized the
relations between the two countries. American officials traveled to Yemen several times to ask
for better and more extensive cooperation, when the authorities of Yemen refused to provide U.S.
investigators with access to witnesses and evidence. On a number of occasions, American
investigators were ordered out of Yemen, because of security reasons. Taking into consideration
that Yemen is the old homeland of bin Laden, and has been considered by the international
community as a country that has been harboring Al Qaeda members that were trying to escape
from Afghanistan, when the United States Army arrived in the country, Yemen has been trying to
find ways to show good faith to the international community and distance itself from such
allegations. In this effort, the government took significant steps, such as adopting a harsher
legislation against terrorists33. The terrorists’ trial took place under the new law, resulting in
stricter and more severe punishments and convictions34. We should mention here that under the
Yemen law all death sentences, which are carried out by firing squad, need confirmation by
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who in previous cases has either annulled or reduced sentences and
even pardoned some individuals35. This trial raised a number of issues and objections on behalf of
the defendants, similar to the ones presented above in the Greek terrorists’ trial. The defense
attorneys objected to the entire proceedings, noting that the suspects were tried by an exceptional
court set up for the very purpose of trying terror suspects and therefore contrary to the country’s
Constitution. According to the defense, the procedures that took place completely breached the
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right to a fair defense. There were also allegations that the defendants had been tortured in order
to confess during their four years of imprisonment.36
In a previous terrorist related trial that took place in Yemen in May 2004, for the bombing of
a French oil supertanker off Yemen’s southeastern coast in October 2002, defense attorneys filed
similar objections. More specifically, lawyers protested not being given full access to their
clients’ files. The lawyers had requested a copy of the files and records related to the case but the
judge ruled that the defense teams could check the files only at the court and were not permitted
to take a copy away with them.37 Finally, in another terrorism-related trial in Yemen in 1999,
eight British Muslims and two Algerians were convicted of planning terrorist bomb attacks in
Yemen and plotting what the prosecution called a campaign to drive out Western influence and
set up an Islamic state in the Arab country. In that trial as well there were protests and objections
from the defense attorneys, who claimed the confessions of the defendants were false and
extracted by torture.38
2. Indonesia
In another part of the world, one more terrorism trial has started, on October 2004. An Islamic
cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir, was charged in connection with the suicide bombing of the Marriot
Hotel in Jakarta in 2003 and the bombings of two nightclubs in Bali in 2002. He is considered to
be the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesian-based terrorist organization affiliated
with Al Qaeda. What makes this particular trial important for the purposes of this research, is the
fact that Bashir was acquitted of related terrorism charges a year ago. According to the court then
there was no evidence that he was the head of Jemaah Islamiyah39. Under pressure, however,
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from the United States and Australia, the Indonesian government continued to detain him while
seeking evidence to support the new charges. It is questionable how lawful and justified his
detainment can be considered, taking into consideration that the court had acquitted him. But
outside the courtroom, the trial raises another issue, as it was very well put by Raymond Bonner,
the author of the relevant article in The New York Times: “How far the United States is willing to
go in helping countries combat terrorism. Key witnesses against Mr. Bashir are in United States
custody at secret locations and the government has barred Indonesian investigators from
questioning them”.40 The United States has captured at least two Indonesians who are considered
to be major figures in the group, linking Bashir directly to Jemaah Islamiyah and to terrorist acts.
The Indonesian authorities, however, are not allowed to interrogate the two witnesses and the Mr.
Bashir’s defense attorney will possibly not have the opportunity to cross-examine them. The trial
also seems to be a test for Indonesia’s new president, who has promised to fight terrorism but at
the same time claims there is no proof that Jemaah Islamiyah exists41.
3. Jordan
In Jordan, on September 2000 a military court sentenced six men to death after convicting
them of conspiracy to carry out the attacks against Israeli and American tourists in Jordan after
New Year’s celebrations. The suspects denied any wrongdoing and denied having links to bin
Laden. They said they gave their confessions under duress42.
4. Russia.
In Russia terrorism is closely related to Chechens, who opposing the country’s tactics and politics
in Chechnya use unorthodox methods, such as “blind hits” and terrorist attacks against civilians.
The latest hit resulted in more than 350 deaths, with most of the victims being children. In
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September 2004 militants seized a school in Beslan, keeping the teachers and children hostages.
The seizure resulted in a number of explosions and gunfire that killed more than 350 people, the
majority of which were children. The Russian authorities have made a strong effort to present the
issue as one of international terrorism, instead of a conflict of local dimensions. They justify that
claim by adding that the Chechen militants are trained and supported by international terrorist
groups, like al Qaeda. This incident has caused tension in the relations of Russia with United
States and Britain. The two countries granted asylum to Chechen separatist figures, an act that led
the Russian Foreign Minister to accuse them of interfering in internal matters and aggravating the
situation in Chechnya. The Kremlin was angered by Britain’s granting of refugee status to
Akhmed Zakayev, an envoy for Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov, and by U.S. asylum for
Ilyas Akhmadov, whom Maskhadov named as his foreign minister while he was Chechnya’s
president in the late 1990s43.
This latest terrorist attack led the Russian parliament to adopt a far reaching anti-terrorism
plan that calls for broadening the powers of all agencies involved in the fight against terrorism
and threatens officials with punishment if they fail to prevent attacks. The anti-terrorism plan
reads that “all institutions of civil society and all branches of authority must become consolidated
in order to resist this evil”44.
The new legislation adopts radical changes, such as providing all agencies involved in
counter-terrorism acts with “special status” while conducting such operations, increased penalties
for those who assist or fund terrorists as well as for officials whose “abuse of office or
negligence” leads to a terrorist attack. Other measures proposed in the plan include introducing
special passport, visa and registration measures in certain Russian regions and tightening security
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and control, as well as a measure calling for international cooperation in the fight against
terrorism.

C. THE UNITED STATES PRECEDENT
Having examined the situation in countries around the world and the problems occurring in
their efforts to try terrorists, it is worthwhile to examine the situation in the United States, which
as we have already seen, has been the leader in defining the strategy and policies followed around
the world. The most significant legislation under which all recent anti- terrorist United States
efforts have taken place is the USA Patriot Act that was passed after the 9/11 terrorist hit in New
York and Washington that shocked the international community45. The Patriot Act expanded the
government’s powers. Examples of this expansion are the search of homes and offices without
prior notice (Sec. 209-220), the use of wiretaps to listen in on telephone conversations and
monitor computers and e-mail messages (Sec. 201, 202, 206, 209), as well as the use of military
commissions to prosecute terrorists. The USA Patriot Act also provides a definition for domestic
terrorism (Sec. 802). As a result of the Patriot Act, the statute of limitations for the prosecution of
some terrorism offenses is extended beyond the usual limits imposed for criminal activity (Sec.
809)46.
Under this new legislation, the pre-existing term “enemy combatants”, relating to the law of
war, acquired a significant value. A person characterized by the United States government as an
“enemy combatant” can be detained until the end of the war, which is the war against terror
(otherwise meaning, that person could be indefinitely detained) and be stripped of all
constitutional rights, including the right to due process of law. Enemy combatants can be detained
without charge, denied counsel and held incommunicado; according to the United States
government, designating any citizen as an enemy combatant is a legitimate exercise of its
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executive discretion that is not subject to judicial review47. It has not been revealed by the
executive branch, however, how a person is classified as an enemy combatant and therefore it
remains a secret what culpable conduct attracts the government’s attention and provokes
indefinite detention and intense interrogation unchecked by the conventional norms of due
process.
One of the cases that most clearly projects the issues raised by the United States antiterrorism policies is that of Yaser Hamdi. Hamdi was apprehended in Afghanistan in the fall of
2001 by the Northern Alliance, an Afghan group of fighters allied with the United States against
the Taliban and was turned over to the Americans. The United States never filed charges against
Hamdi. The only official statement of allegations came in a declaration by Michael Hobbs, a
Defense Department special adviser, in July 200248. According to that declaration, Hamdi “had
affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training” and “stayed with the unit
after the United States began military operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban” in October 2001.
Hamdi was taken to Guantanamo Bay, a place where the American military authorities often
transfer “enemy combatants” or individuals suspected of being affiliated with terrorist groups. In
early 2002, however, the military discovered that Hamdi had U.S. nationality and immediately
transferred him to Navy brigs in Virginia and later South Carolina49. He was held
incommunicado and subjected to an indefinite detention without charges, without any findings by
a military tribunal and without access to a lawyer50. In August 16, 2002, the Fourth Circuit held
that Hamdi was entitled to due process of law as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution which states that “No person shall….be deprived of…liberty…without due
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process of law”51. According to Judge Doumar confining someone indefinitely who has not been
convicted of any offense, let alone be charged, and depriving that person of the assistance of
counsel, without more evidence, appeared to be a gross violation of the fundamental principles of
justice and an offense against due process. It appears that the privilege of citizenship entitled
Hamdi to a “limited judicial inquiry” to determine the legality of his detention “under the war
powers of the political branches”, but he was not constitutionally entitled to challenge the facts
presented in the Mobbs Declaration or his designation as an enemy combatant. The Supreme
Court that discussed the case, after Hamdi appealed the prior decision, decided in June 2004 that
Hamdi was entitled to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification as an enemy
combatant, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decision maker52. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the American government signed an
agreement with Hamdi that would give him his freedom and the right to return to Saudi Arabia,
under the terms that he would renounce his U.S. citizenship and give up his right to visit a
number of countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria53.
The Hamdi case raised a number of concerns, mostly related to constitutional and civil rights
of people suspected of terrorist acts. Hamdi was kept in solitary confinement for more than 2
years, without any rights and unable to contact his family or a counsel. The legitimacy of such
measure has been highly questioned and the United States have been internationally criticized
about their policies, regarding “enemy combatants”54. Amnesty International portrayed Hamdi’s
indefinite detention without charge as an attempt to circumvent the criminal justice system.
According to its Annual Report for the year 2004, “the US-led “war on terror” continued to be
waged using indiscriminate and disproportionate means. Hundreds of foreign nationals remained
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in prolonged indefinite detention without charge or trial in US custody outside the US mainland.
Most of those detained as so-called “enemy combatants” were held without any form of judicial
process; for a handful, the only way out of their legal black hole appeared to be through grossly
unfair trials before military commissions. Authoritative worldwide opinion condemned the
blatant disregard for international and US constitutional standards by the USA. Many of the
measures taken by the US authorities in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks undermined
the fabric of international law”55. Hamdi is only one out of two U.S. citizens but also out of a
number of people in general, detained in Guantanamo and other undisclosed locations by the
United States military, for intelligence purposes.
The Guantanamo cases.
According to the Human Rights Watch Report in June 2002, the number of people held at
the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo was expected to exceed 500.56 A number of these people
filed several actions challenging the legality of their detention and asserting various causes of
action, including federal habeas corpus. In Khaled A. F. Al Odah v. United States, the District
court held that it lacked jurisdiction, because their claims were related to the lawfulness of their
detention which could only be reviewed through a habeas corpus and the court had no jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus for aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United
States57. The District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments58. The aliens then petitioned for a
writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court that discussed the cases reversed and remanded. According
to the court, the aliens had been imprisoned for more than two years in a territory over which the
United States exercised “exclusive jurisdiction and control”. The court held that Article 28
U.S.C.S. section 2241 required nothing more and that it conferred on the district court jurisdiction
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to hear the habeas corpus. It also concluded that the fact that they were detained under military
custody was irrelevant to the question of the district court’s jurisdiction over their nonhabeas
statutory claims, because Article 28 U.S.C.S., clause 1350 explicitly conferred the privilege of
suing for an actionable tort on aliens59

III. THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY AND THE TERRORISTS’
DEFENSE ARGUMENTS

After having examined the way a number of countries have tried to adopt the United States
policy and legislation in fighting terrorism, we can now identify the common difficulties that
different judicial and legal systems had to deal with, when bringing terrorists to justice. Although,
most of the above discussed cases and trials were unrelated to each other, dealing with different
terrorist organizations and defendants that had no relations with each other and no
communication, we can observe similarities in their defense strategies as well as their concerns
and complaints. The common arguments that were used in all of the above mentioned cases were
the following:
•

“Special

Courts” were founded, for the purpose of trying terrorists. None of these

courts were in compliance with the countries’ constitutions. Instead, they were based
on new anti-terrorism laws that were passed right before or during the examination of
such cases.
•

“Due

process” was not granted to any of the defendants, mostly because the defense

attorneys had limited access to the documents and witnesses as well as because
political interests limited the judges’ ability of independent judgment. We observed
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that most of the countries that dealt with these terrorists, have been trying to renounce
the “label” of harboring terrorists that was put upon them by the international
community.
•

The interrogation and collection of evidence methods that were used were criticized as
violating the defendants’ constitutional and civil rights: allegations of torture of the
terrorists and conditions of psychological pressure in order to extract their confessions
were made in almost all of those trials, by the defense attorneys.

•

Finally, in all of the above discussed cases, suspects were detained for long periods of
times, contrary to the lawful time limits, before they were even officially charged.

In our effort to evaluate these arguments and concerns, it seems worthwhile to mention that a
country’s sovereign law seems to be of lesser significance, when confronted with an international
effort to fight terrorism, and human rights seem to lose the value that decades of legal progress
have granted them. Even if we accept that in the United States, the common law system solves
such conflicts, it is apparent however that in civil law countries such as the European countries,
with a long tradition in constitutional rights and civil liberties, the adaptation of the United States
policies is at least problematic and dangerous for the future of their legal systems.
A further analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems will make
this observation clearer. First of all, the main significant difference lies in the order of priority
between jurisprudence and doctrine; civil law gives priority to doctrine, whereas common law is
based more on jurisprudence. The reason for this difference is the different role that was
historically given to the legislator. Civil law systems –based mainly on Roman law- adopt in their
majority the theory of separation of powers: the legislator legislates and the courts apply the law.
Common law, on the other hand, has as its core the judge-made precedent. Civil law focuses
rather on legal principles, which courts are required to apply to specific cases and facts. Common
law, on the contrary, sets out a new specific rule to a new specific set of facts and provides the
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principal source of law. In this respect, courts are only secondary sources of law in civil law
countries, while their role in common law countries is primary.
The result of such differences in the ability of the courts to use discretion in interpreting law
between common law and civil law countries is that common law can easily adjust to fit legal
situations arising from new and never-before-encountered problems. On the contrary, civil law
countries are much more rigid when it comes to “adjusting” civil rights and fundamental
constitutional law to fit such new situations. This difference in flexibility between common and
civil law can be attributed to the basic priorities given in such countries as to what the law
protects. More specifically, common law has as a priority the protection of public welfare and
state sovereignty; although there are express civil rights to ensure that the government does not
have absolute power over its country’s citizens, there are mechanisms within the U.S.
Constitution, for instance, allowing the government to suspend civil rights, so that sovereignty of
that government and public welfare is sustained. Such a mechanism is the suspension of habeas
corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution: The privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus may be suspended by Congress “when the public safety may require it.” Habeas
Corpus is “a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the
party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal”60 Although such a mechanism is provided to
Congress under the Constitution, history shows that it can and has been used by other branches of
the Government; President Lincoln suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus, during the early part of
the Civil War, on his own initiative, without the legislative branch asserting its constitutional
power.
The way the courts have interpreted that power to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus is also
characteristic of the common law approach; the Supreme Court observed in the McCleskey v.
Zant case that “the writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties. But the writ
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has potentialities for evil as well as for good. Abuse of the writ may undermine the orderly
administration of justice and therefore weaken the forces of authority that are essential for
civilization.”61 In a much older decision, the Supreme Court also set the priority given by
common law to the public welfare, when it said in Moyer v. Peabody that “when it comes to a
decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of
individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants
the substitution of executive process for judicial process.”62
Civil law countries, on the other hand, give priority to civil rights of individuals. These rights
in many civil law countries are provided not only exclusively to their citizens, but to all people
within their territory, and cannot be taken away, under any circumstances, mainly because they
are granted by the Constitution itself. The Greek Constitution, for instance, has a separate part
dedicated to civil rights that includes 21 statutes, each statute referring to a civil right. For
example, Article 5, Clause 3 of the Greek Constitution states: “Personal freedom cannot be
violated. Nobody can be prosecuted or arrested or be imprisoned or confined in any other way,
except only when and how the law mandates.” The text of the Greek Constitution leaves very
limited discretion to the judges for interpretation; the word “Greek citizen” is expressly
mentioned in those rights that are exclusive for Greek citizens, while the rest are granted to
anyone in the Greek territory.
Therefore, countries governed by civil law are limited in using their discretion when dealing
with arising issues by the inherent precedent given to civil rights by constitution, statutory law or
custom, whereas common law countries are not limited in this respect. Common law is more
flexible and allows the courts to establish new rules that apply to the new circumstances; people
are familiar with such tactics and changes, unlike civil law countries, where a sudden detour from
the norms of conduct, as they are defined by the laws, can cause a feeling of insecurity and lead
61

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467; 111 S. Ct. 1454; 113 L. Ed. 2d 517; 1991 US Lexis 2218; 59 USLW 4288; 91
Cal. Daily Op. Service 2680
62
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78; 29 S. Ct. 235; 53 L. Ed. 410; 1909 US Lexis 1798.

26

to a negative reaction as well as intense skepticism, on behalf of the legal scholars as well as the
people.
All these examples lead us to the conclusion that we are still a long way from implementing
an international anti-terrorism legislation, based on a consensus of all countries. The reasons are
not only the different legal systems, but also the different cultural, ethical and religious factors
that have influenced the various countries’ judicial and legislative procedures. Even when the
target and the goal are common, still the differences are significant. To support this argument, we
include here the attempts to define the term “terrorism” from several members of the European
community, that share more or less common legal systems and cultural and religious
backgrounds. The French penal code (Article 421-1) refers to terrorist acts as acts that can disturb
severely the public order through intimidation or terrorizing (the difficulty of defining the term
“terrorism” is apparent, since the French legislature could not avoid including the term itself in
the definition). The Portuguese penal code (Article 300) mentions the violation of national
interests, the change or disturbance of the national institutions’ function, the enforcement of
public authorities to act or not act and the threat of individuals or groups. The Spanish penal code
(Article 571) refers to the goal of demolishing the constitutional order and the severe violation of
public order. The Italian penal code (Articles 270a, 280 and 289) refers to the demolition of the
democratic order. The German penal code (Article 129a) mentions the founding of terrorist
organizations without defining the term “terrorist”. Finally, the British legislation (Terrorism Act
2000), which is considered by the European Committee as the most significant anti-terrorism
legislation among the members of the European Union, defines terrorism as an act or threat of act
that aims to influence the government or to intimidate the whole or part of the population. This
act or threat of act is aiming to promote a political, religious or ideological goal and includes
mainly serious violence against individuals or serious damages of property or poses a serious
danger for the health or safety of the population. This definition, however, is so broad that it
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cannot be adopted by the rest of the European Union members who have a more liberal penal
tradition and require more precise and specific legal definitions.
The European Committee has made a proposal to achieve a common definition of the word
“terrorism” among the members of the European Union. This proposal recognizes that “the
majority of the terrorist acts are basic crimes of the common penal code” that get their terrorism
character due to the motives of their actor to severely injure or destroy the fundamental principles
and foundations of the state and to threaten the population. It is claimed that such a definition as
well as any legislation adopted by the European Union will have more of a symbolic character
than any realistic value. This is basically due to the fact that the criminal law in most of the
European Union states is based on the act and not the beliefs of the actor, which are of no legal
significance unless such beliefs are made concrete by a specific act: Cogigationis poenam nemo
patitur. Such a proposal suggests that there is an attempt to create a special penal legislation
based exclusively on the motives and not the acts of the violators. If one considers how unsafe
and subjective it is to identify the motives, one can also realize how dangerous that is for the
safety of law and, consequently, for the freedoms of the individuals.
The European Commission’s proposal defines terrorist offenses as offenses committed
purposely by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or their
populations, with the intent to terrorize them and to severely harm or destroy their political,
economical or social foundations63. This definition covers state terrorism as well, although it is
more than obvious that the state that will adopt this anti-terrorism legislation will not enforce it in
possible terrorist acts that it will implement or encourage64.
Even if the European Union members accept this proposal, it will still be difficult for the
various states to adopt it and implement it in compliance with their domestic laws. By pursuing a
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completely safe society, it seems that we are heading more towards a less liberal one. Everything
that is added up in security is taken away from freedom. Moreover, we need to take into
consideration the fact that the same measure towards security might be characterized by one state
as restricting liberties too much, while in another country it might be a natural, expected and nonrestrictive regulation.

III. CONCLUSION

Having analyzed the situation in various countries in regard to anti-terrorism efforts as well as
the problems that the exporting of U.S. policies has created, we conclude that suspension of civil
and constitutional rights should not be the means in the goal of fighting terrorism; not only
because civil law is in direct conflict with such practices, but also and more importantly because
the same goal can be achieved through less harsh and more fair means. What would those means
be? We will suggest some alternatives that could lead to the desired outcome:
1.

We have already mentioned, in the Greek precedent, the beneficial effects of the
cooperation of Greek authorities with the U.S. and British authorities. Therefore, an
international cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts, through exchange of
information, advanced technology and expertise, can help countries be more effective
in arresting terrorists and collecting and evaluating evidence that can be later used in a
court of law, in order to bring these terrorists to justice and convict them. Torture of
suspects, suspension of their fundamental rights and violation of procedural laws
creates the danger of victimizing the offenders and negatively affecting the public
opinion, which might possibly relate anti-terrorism to anti-civil rights legislation. No
special courts are needed to try a terrorist; they have been effective so far in trying any
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other criminal, so there is no reason to lose our faith in our traditional legal systems,
based on justice, protection of civil rights and treatment of any suspect as innocent,
until proven guilty.
2.

In our effort to deprive terrorists from finding harbor in certain countries, we should
consider the conditions that influence a country’s or a nation’s decision to follow a
terrorist-friendly policy: conditions such as poverty, political instability, lack of
democracy, injustice and oppression are ideal for terrorism to be born and supported.
Therefore, we believe that the international community should focus its attention on
places around the world where such conditions exist today and try to provide the
means for reestablishment of democracy and justice, in order to deprive terrorists from
a place to hide.

The war against terrorism can be won without sacrificing our legal ethics, without violating
constitutional and human rights and procedures. We chose to close this chapter by referring to the
words of a highly respected individual, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan:
“The international community is defined not only by what it is for, but by what and whom it is
against. The United Nations must have the courage to recognize that just as there are common
aims, there are common enemies. To defeat them, all nations must join forces in an effort
encompassing every aspect of the open, free global system…. No people, no region and no
religion should be targeted because of the unspeakable acts of individuals…. Terrorism threatens
every society. As the world takes action against it, we have all been reminded of the need to
address the conditions that permit the growth of such hatred and depravity. We must confront
violence, bigotry and hatred even more resolutely.. There are those who will hate and who will
kill even if every injustice is ended. But if the world can show that it will carry on, that it will
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persevere in creating a stronger, more just, more benevolent and more genuine international
community across all lines of religion and race, then terrorism will have failed.”65

65

The New York Times, Friday 21 September 2001
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